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What Next for International Investment Law and Policy?:  
A Review of the UNCTAD Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation 
 
 
Ahmad Ghouri 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Increasing dissatisfaction with investor-State dispute settlement has weakened the 
adversarial approach to international investment law and policy. This article argues that global 
initiatives, such as the UNCTAD’s Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation (the ‘Action 
Menu’), provides good policy praxis to redirect the development of international investment law 
from adversarial to a constructive path. The Action Menu suggests rebuilding of future international 
investment law and policy with a reconciliatory spirit and by promoting investment facilitation for 
sustainable development. To demystify the Action Menu’s policy praxis, this article addresses the 
following key questions: How is the Action Menu’s proposed investment facilitation framework 
different from existing investment promotion and protection strategies? Does the Action Menu 
propose a fundamental change to existing international investment policy agenda? Are there other 
comparable initiatives that may enlighten the Action Menu’s approach? To what extent the existing 
domestic policies on investment facilitation reflect the Action Menu’s approaches? Would the 
Action Menu’s investment facilitation framework indeed promote sustainable development? The 
analysis primarily hinges on the impression that at the time when international investment law is 
fraught with internal antagonism, the Action Menu’s investment facilitation framework brings 
positive vibes to international investment law and policy making. Key strengths of the Action Menu 
are its holistic treatment of all primary foreign investment policy stakeholders (i.e. foreign investors 
and their home and host States) under one policy framework, and its whole-of-government approach 
for implementation of investment facilitation policies. The apparent weaknesses are a lack of 
attention to curb possible race to the bottom and visible lapses in offering a collaborative 
sustainable development programme. The article concludes that although the Action Menu sets out 
great policy initiatives, there are many issues that remain to be addressed. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The existing problems with international investment law are well known.1 Fundamentally, 
these problems are caused by both substantive and procedural rules of international investment 
                                                 
 Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Sussex. The author would like to thank the reviewers and editors 
of Manchester Journal of International Economic Law for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1 See Charles Brower and Stephan Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law? ’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2009, 9(2): 471-498; Suzanne A. Spears, ‘The Quest for 
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law. The substantive rules on investor rights and the international standards of investment 
protection are widely criticised as being vague and subject to multiple interpretations.2 In 
addition to uncertainty and fragmentation, these deficiencies create problems for a State’s right 
to regulate business in public interest.3 On the procedural side, prior decisions of investor-State 
arbitral tribunals are not followed by subsequent tribunals as binding precedents resulting in a 
fragmented and inharmonious development of substantive norms. 4  The possibility of 
jurisdictional overlap of different arbitral institutions allows multiple proceedings on the same 
dispute producing inconsistencies in the decisions of arbitral tribunals at different fora.5 Other 
procedural flaws include lack of judicial review or appeals mechanism and concerns regarding 
arbitrators including methods of appointment, lack of tenure and a detailed code of conduct, 
and potential conflict of interest.6 
These concerns have prompted critics, such as Martin Khor, to characterise investor-
State arbitration as the world’s worst judicial system; and a variety of actions by governments 
including suspending negotiations of new investment treaties, attempts to renegotiate or 
withdraw from the existing investment treaties, and withdrawal from the International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. 7  Apart from 
national sovereignty and public policy concerns, the idea of pre-conceived consent to 
international arbitration in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), that largely constitute the 
primary substantive and procedural framework of international investment law, is irritating for 
States because it may proliferate disputes and tarnish their image as a prospective destination 
for foreign investment. Although studies have determined that concluding BITs has a positive 
effect on FDI inflows and that the effect is larger when developing countries conclude these 
                                                 
Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements’, Journal of International Economic Law, 
2010, 13(4): 1037-75; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’, in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 39-45; Ari Afilalo, ‘Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial 
(Re-)Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 2005, 25(2): 
279-314, at 282; Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatising Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Derisions’, Fordham Law Review, 2005, 73(4): 1521-625, at 1523; Ari 
Afilalo, ‘Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their 
Legitimacy Crisis’, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 2004, 17(1): 51-96; Charles H. Brower 
II, ‘Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2003, 
36(1): 37-94; Charles N. Brower, Charles H. Brower II and Jeremy K. Sharpe, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Global 
Adjudication System’, Arbitration International, 2003, 19(4): 415-40. 
2 Brower and Schill (2009), supra note 1, at 473.  
3 Bruno Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2011, 60(3): 573-96; Kyla Tienhaara, ‘What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes 
and the Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries’, Global Environmental Politics 2006, 6(4): 73-100. 
4 Brower and Schill (2009), supra note 1, at 473.  
5 Ibid.  
6 See, for example, Hugo Perezcano, ‘Risks of Selective Approach to Investor-State Arbitration’, CIGI Investor 
State Arbitration Series, Paper No. 3, April 2016.   
7 Martin Khor, ‘The World’s Worst Judicial System?’, South Bulletin 74 (Geneva: South Centre, 5 July 2013). The 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) is a ‘multilateral investment 
treaty’ entered into force on 14 October 1966.   
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agreements with economically more important countries,8 there is no hard-empirical evidence 
if the existing practice of BITs promote foreign direct investment (FDI).9  
More fundamentally, conflicting arbitration awards do not bring about domestic and 
international policy reform to prevent further disputes. Although overwhelming presence of 
BITs with starkly similar provisions has manifested conclusions that they transpire as an 
international legal and policy framework,10 they are essentially bilateral instruments having 
little rule making significance for non-party States.11 Instead of encouraging the development 
of multi-stakeholder co-operation leading to a universal policy framework for treatment of 
foreign investments, BITs are arguably one-sided agreements imposing international minimum 
standards of treatment for foreign investors on developing countries to which they would not 
have agreed in a multilateral treaty.12 At domestic level, most existing BITs are essentially 
passive instruments having no direct application in a State’s national investment policy space. 
For most BIT party States, BITs remain dormant until a foreign investor initiates a BIT based 
claim. This is when a BIT is eventually operationalised. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) led 
negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) collapsed in 1998, which has 
created a vacuum in multilateral investment policy making. At this important junction when 
policy makers from both capital importing and exporting States are contemplating various 
options to restructure international investment regime, there is a pressing need to find 
internationally well-coordinated policy alternatives to maximise the benefits of FDI in a level 
playing field between home and host States, to promote mutual co-operation rather than 
competition leading to a race to the bottom, and most importantly, to promote investment in 
sustainable development.                     
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recently 
published a revised version of its Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation (the ‘Action 
Menu’).13 After the collapse of OECD MAI negotiations, the UNCTAD Action Menu is the 
first attempt by an international organisation to potentially redirect international investment 
policy to a more co-ordinated and constructive path as compared to existing proliferated regime 
composed of several thousand BITs. As compared to BITs, the Action Menu is not meant to be 
a treaty or a treaty draft; and since investment facilitation essentially falls within a State’s 
eminent domain, it is primarily meant to promote the adoption of international best practices 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Jeswald Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan (Chapter 5) and Tim Buthe and Helen Milner (Chapter 
6) in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (ed.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment – Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
9 See, for example, Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries?’, World Development, 2005, 33(10): 1567-85. 
10 Stephan Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2009).  
11 See, for example, Aniruddha Rajput, ‘The Myth of a Multilateral Framework in International Investment Law’, 
Indian Journal of International Law, 2016, 56(3-4): 427-61.  
12 This is believed to be one of the reasons why the OECD MAI negotiations failed. See, for example, Daniel Egan, 
‘The Limits of Internationalization: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment’ 
Critical Sociology, 2001, 27(3): 74-97.  
13 The UNCTAD Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation, UNCTAD/DIAE (September 2016) (hereinafter 
the ‘Action Menu’). 
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for national investment policy making. By recommending options for national investment 
policy, the Action Menu’s provisions are meant to promote the ease of business and prevent the 
accrual of investor-State disputes.14 These options are not meant to be standalone provisions; 
they are mutually inclusive suggesting a comprehensive policy framework directed towards the 
common goal of investment facilitation.  
The Action Menu’s importance cannot be overstated. First, it is likely to yield a 
harmonisation effect. The Action Menu’s ultimate objectives of investment facilitation are 
framed within the preview of well celebrated principles of transparency, predictability, 
efficiency and accountability.15 The more detailed policy options given in the Action Menu 
reflect international best practices and their adoption by Sates would produce State practice 
leading to the development of internationally recognisable standards. Second, the Action Menu 
creates a niche for its application by nuancedly distinguishing investment facilitation from 
investment promotion and protection. This distinction is arguably notional, however, for the 
purposes of international investment policy making, it serves an important purpose in 
distinguishing the Action Menu’s objectives from contentious issues of minimum standards of 
protection and investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). For dispute resolution, the Action 
Menu has concentrated primarily on mechanisms to prevent investor-State disputes. In the 
event of an unavoidable dispute, the Action Menu has proposed resolution through domestic 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems instead of the supra-national ISDS.  
Third, departing from the controversial trajectories on (re-)making of international 
investment law through ISDS decisions, primary contemplation of the Action Menu is domestic 
policy making for investment facilitation. This reorientation effectively diverts the focus of 
international investment policy making from controversial minimum standards to strengthening 
of domestic rule of law and capacity building. This is a significant policy shift where host States 
are increasingly becoming dissatisfied with the rights given to foreign investors in the existing 
BITs and the possibility for investors to bring ISDS claims. Fourth, the Action Menu’s focus 
on investment facilitation lays a great foundation for home States to engage positively in 
capacity building and technical assistance programs to enable the adoption of investment 
facilitation policies in host States. This promotes the spirit of co-operation rather than 
imposition of standards by the north to the south. Finally, the Action Menu’s investment policy 
options are supposed to promote investment in sustainable development in accordance with the 
indicators that the United Nations (UN) Member States are expected to use to frame their 
agendas and political policies.16  
The primary idea of this article is to review the Action Menu to identify and analyse its 
strengths and weaknesses, considering the above stated problems with the current international 
investment law and policy regime. The article engages with the significant questions that the 
Action Menu has raised and suggests means to address those question, namely: What are the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., at 3. 
15 See the UNCTAD Policy Hub’s Investment Policy Blog, available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Bl 
og (accessed 19 March 2018). 
16 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 3.  
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objectives of the Action Menu and how does the Action Menu strive to achieve them? Are there 
any other comparable initiatives that may enlighten the Action Menu’s approach and policy 
directions? To what extent the existing domestic policies related to investment facilitation 
reflect the Action Menu’s approaches? Does the Action Menu’s investment facilitation policy 
framework realistically promote investment in sustainable development? Other matters that the 
article analyses include the Action Menu’s breadth to embrace all three primary stakeholders 
(namely, foreign investors and their home and host States) in a single document, its whole-of-
government approach towards the implementation of investment facilitation framework, and 
the issue of primacy of national interest as an obstacle to the Action Menu’s aims. The question 
whether the Action Menu effectively addresses the problem of race to the bottom, and the 
possible issues concerning the Action Menu’s proposed multi-stakeholder consultation by host 
States are also discussed.  
The discussion on investment policy is from a legal angle. The tone is thought-provoking, 
with a view that the article will open dialogue to investigate and understand the role of 
investment facilitation policy in the much-needed overhaul of international investment law and 
policy. The article is structured as follows: Part 2 summarizes the objectives of the Action Menu 
and highlights the issues that arise from its distinction between investment facilitation and 
investment promotion. Part 3 places the Action Menu in the context of other similar investment 
facilitation policy initiatives taken by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). This part analyses differences and similarities in the approach of these 
international organisations in the implementation of policy framework for investment 
facilitation. Part 4 investigates the existing domestic investment policies implemented by 
various States that reflect on the Action Menu’s approach. Part 5 presents a detailed analysis of 
the selected ‘Action Lines’ of the Action Menu. Part 6 examines the critical role assigned by 
the Action Menu to domestic investment promotion agencies (IPAs) to implement investment 
facilitation policies. Part 7 concludes the article by providing a list of proposals that should be 
included in the Action Menu. The overall conclusions are that although the Action Menu is a 
step in the right direction, there are many gaps that need to be filled.  
 
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACTION MENU 
 
Foreign investment policy analysists view promotion and facilitation policies as a cost effective 
means to credibly signal a host State’s intention that it is interested in attracting FDI and 
improving the business environment for the private sector.17 Although there has been acute 
competition among capital importing States to strategize investment promotion, no serious 
initiative existed to develop uniform national policies on investment facilitation. 18  The 
                                                 
17  Dirk W. Te Velde, ‘Measuring State-Business Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Institutions and Pro-Poor 
Growth (IPPG) Discussion Paper Series Number Four, 2006. See also, ‘Investment Promotion and Enterprise 
Development Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific, No. 1’, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.03.II.F.36, 2003).    
18 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011 – Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 
(Sales No. E.11.II.D.2), at 94. 
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UNCTAD’s Action Menu has filled this gap and, if implemented by States, will likely to 
increase the FDI flows. The initiative is also very timely because the above discussed concerns 
regarding the existing FDI regime have seriously obstructed the development of international 
investment law and policy requiring new thinking for future of domestic and international FDI 
regulation. 
The key feature of the Action Menu is its focus on improvements in domestic investment 
facilitation policy. In this regard, the objectives of Action Menu are starkly different from other 
significant initiatives to reform international investment law and policy, such as the creation of 
a multilateral investment court,19 and the emerging new generation of BITs that promote more 
cooperation at all stages of foreign investment to achieve a fair balance between foreign 
investors’ and host States’ rights.20 
Both these initiatives remain primarily concerned with the promotion and protection of 
foreign investment, whereas the Action Menu is in essence a framework for investment 
facilitation. The creation of a multilateral investment court is not readily imminent due to the 
existing divide between capital importing and exporting States over the minimum standards of 
investment protection. In contrast, the Action Menu does not deal with international minimum 
standards of investment protection and primarily focuses on a coordinated strategy on domestic 
reform of investment facilitation policies.  
Regarding BITs, States are likely to continue redesigning their BIT practice to negotiate 
better deals that work for both BIT party States. Although the new generation of BITs, such as 
the BIT between Brazil and India,21 include aspects of investment facilitation, they principally 
remain mutually negotiated deals between the party States. Because BITs are bilateral deals, it 
is likely that the BIT practice will remain fragmented. On the other hand, the Action Menu’s 
proposals are aimed at setting broader policy goals for investment facilitation beneficial for all 
States that are willing to enhance their domestic regulatory capacity to get most out of foreign 
investments and prevent investor-States disputes. The Action Menu’s proposals set standards 
for investment facilitation policies giving States a choice to include them in their future BITs 
if agreeable to both BIT parties.    
The Action Menu’s primary objective is to suggest domestic policy reform for 
investment facilitation as an independent policy area distinguishing it from investment 
promotion or protection. Investment promotion has typically been viewed to include activities 
through which governments aim to attract FDI inflows.22 In the existing literature on domestic 
policy on FDI, investment facilitation is usually considered as a part of the investment 
                                                 
19  Since 2015 the European Commission has been working to establish a Multilateral Investment Court. See 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 (accessed 19 March 2018). 
20 The recently concluded India-Brazil BIT reportedly does not contain any provision on investor-State arbitration. 
Instead, it is understood to have provided for a tiered dispute resolution method including the use of an ombudsman, 
State-State arbitration and procedures for dispute prevention, including the establishment of a joint committee tasked 
with overseeing the BIT’s future implementation. The text of India-Brazil BIT has not been released but these 
features appear in Brazil’s Model BIT. 
21 Ibid. 
22 For detailed discussion on investment promotion, see, Louis T. Wells and Alvin G. Wint, ‘Marketing a Country: 
Promotion as a Tool for Attracting Foreign Investment’, Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) Occasional 
Paper, (Revised Edition 2000), 13(1): 1-204. 
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promotion and protection policy. For example, the United Nations’ Investment Promotion and 
Enterprise Development Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific (2003) conflates investment 
promotion and facilitation as follows:23 
Investment and business facilitation measures include promotion efforts, provision of 
incentives to foreign investors, reduction of unnecessary costs of doing business in a 
host country (e.g., reducing or eliminating corruption and improving administrative 
efficiency) and provision of amenities that contribute to the quality of life of foreign 
investors and expatriates. Investment facilitation services are another increasingly 
important component of promotion activities in both developed and developing 
countries. Such services consist of counselling, accelerating the various stage of the 
approval process and providing assistance in obtaining all the permits needed. 
Similarly, the International Finance Corporation’s Global Investment Promotion Best 
Practices (2012) use the term investment promotion and facilitation interchangeably 
disregarding any differences between the two.24 The main areas of investment promotion have 
traditionally comprised of strategy and organisation, lead generation, facilitation and 
investment services.25 However, the Action Menu creates a fine distinction between facilitation 
and promotion in the following terms:26 
One [promotion] is about promoting a location as an investment destination (and is 
therefore often country-specific and competitive in nature), while the other [facilitation] 
is about making it easier for investors to establish or expand their investments, as well 
as to conduct their day-to-day business in host countries. 
The Action Menu’s distinction suggests that investment promotion essentially aims to 
promote a certain location as an investment destination, which is traditionally achieved by 
incentives such as tax rebates or creation of special economic zones. Investment facilitation, on 
the other hand, is concerned with easing investment transactions through domestic regulation 
on establishment, retention and expansion of investments. Therefore, while investment 
promotion policies draw the attention of foreign investors in order to invite them into a host 
State, investment facilitation aims to support the investors that have shown strong interest to 
invest or have already invested in a host State.  
The practical significance of the distinction between facilitation and promotion is quite 
remarkable. Promotion, in its traditional sense, encompasses competition between States to 
attract more FDI and potentially leads to a race to the bottom, whereas, the focus of facilitation 
is on domestic reform and capacity building. It goes without saying that the outcome of 
investment facilitation policies will also yield investment promotion as some foreign investors 
may particularly choose to invest mainly because their reliance is greater on a State’s 
investment facilitation practices. However, attraction of FDI is not the primary purpose of 
                                                 
23 ‘Investment Promotion and Enterprise Development Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific, No. 1’, supra note 17, at 
107. ‘The OECD Policy Framework for Investment User’s Toolkit’, infra note 102, has also described investment 
facilitation as part of investment promotion activities.   
24 International Finance Corporation, ‘Global Investment Promotion Best Practices’ (Washington: World Bank, 
2012). 
25 Henry Loewendahl, ‘A Framework for FDI Promotion’, Transnational Corporations, 2001, 10(1): 1-42, at 3.  
26 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 3.  
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investment facilitation policy in the first place but could only be a natural outcome of both 
promotion and facilitation policies. In other words, investment promotion and facilitation 
policies complement each other, and both remain important factors to attract and retain FDI.      
However, in order to propagate that the Action Menu is truly meant to provide policy 
guidelines that are globally acceptable and are capable of mending the existing North-South 
divide aiming to achieve the shared objective of investment facilitation for sustainable 
development, it is important to set its aims apart from some of the predominant BIT practices 
that portray the prevalent North-South divide. While the Action Menu’s distinction between 
promotion and facilitation is useful for setting up the policy agenda for domestic reform, a 
somewhat similar distinction exists in existing BIT practice. 27  There is a longstanding 
distinction between pre-entry and post-entry BIT models, where the first type of treaties create 
admission and establishment rights for foreign investors and the second type of treaties create 
only post-establishment rights. 28  The pre-entry model typically accords admission and 
establishment rights to foreign investors in accordance with national treatment standards (same 
treatment as granted to nationals of host State) and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment 
standards (same treatment as granted to investors from other States) to foreign investors.29 
Whereas, the post-entry model makes the entry of foreign investment subject to domestic laws 
and procedures,30 which are obviously within the host State’s power to change putting foreign 
investors at a greater risk.31 However, post-entry model allows host States space to reformulate 
their domestic laws and put restrictions on admission and establishment of foreign investment 
in accordance with their national public policies and interests. Pre-entry model investment 
treaties have been viewed as a means to further the agenda of developed capital exporting States 
because they restrict host States’ right to regulate, which is an essential feature of State 
sovereignty.32  
In this regard, it is easy to misconstrue the Action Menu’s distinction between investment 
promotion and investment facilitation. The Action Menu’s investment facilitation framework 
can be viewed as another means to achieve the objectives intended from the pre-entry model 
investment treaties. It could be argued, for example, that the distinction is a covert attack on the 
host States’ regulatory space through swaying the domestic regulation of foreign investments 
disguised to achieve the objectives of pre-entry investment treaty model. The possibility of such 
negative views is further supported by the Action Menu’s direct reference that it strives to 
bridge existing gaps in investment facilitation in the investment treaty practice.33 There is, 
                                                 
27 Rudolf Dolzer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
87-97.  
28  Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment 
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2009), at 134.  
29 Ibid., at 134-7.   
30 Ibid.  
31 Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’, in August Reinisch 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9-28, at 12.  
32 Howard Mann and Charles Brower, NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory, Failed Experiments, 
and Lessons for the FTAA (American Society of International Law, 2003). However, no legal obligation on part of 
the host State arises unless a formal investment contract has been concluded or an investment has been actually made. 
For discussion on this point, see Joubin-Bret 2008), supra note 31, at 14.  
33 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 4.  
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therefore, a serious need for UNCTAD to clarify that the Action Menu’s focus is on post-entry 
facilitation only, and it is not meant to influence domestic rules and policies on admission of 
foreign investment.  
The clarification that investment facilitation is concerned with post-entry investment 
policy would also be useful to endorse that the Action Menu’s guidelines have nothing to do 
with the existing controversial international minimum standards,34 which have historically 
divided developed and developing countries and played a significant role in triggering 
legitimacy crisis for the prevalent FDI regime. 35  Historically, developed countries have 
forcefully promoted the idea of international minimum standards requiring treatment of aliens 
in accordance with a minimum set of standards that States must respect when dealing with 
foreign nationals and their property regardless of their domestic legislation and practices. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have constantly propagated for the application of 
national treatment to aliens that requires treatment of foreigners equal to nationals.36  
The application of international minimum standards to govern investor-State relations 
also leads to controversy over the expansive interpretation of fair and equitable standard, which 
is included in most international investment agreements (IIAs),37 by ISDS tribunals.38 As 
compared with binding, yet controversial, international minimum standards, the Action Menu’s 
guidelines are primarily meant to be implemented by States unilaterally to improve their 
domestic investment climate. This distinction obviously has significant legal importance as it 
clarifies that the purpose of the Action Menu’s investment facilitation guidelines is to promote 
mutual cooperation rather than to impose legal obligations. Accordingly, if investment 
facilitation provisions are included in IIAs, they should be viewed as distinct from promotion 
and protection provisions because facilitation is meant to promote mutual cooperation to 
improve domestic investment climate rather than to create legal obligations based on 
international minimum standards.  
Investment facilitation, in the Action Menu’s sense, is meant to make foreign investors’ 
operations easier, and it can also be argued that facilitating investments is merely a means by 
which investor protections are operationalised in practice. However, as contemplated above, 
the existing framework of investment protection is built on the idea of international minimum 
standard enforced through ISDS tribunals,39 which is primarily operationalised by IIAs, i.e. 
                                                 
34 A prominent French international lawyer Charles Rousseau, for example, has defined international minimum 
standard as ‘a norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of aliens, by providing for a 
minimum set of principles which States, regardless of their domestic legislation and practices, must respect when 
dealing with foreign nationals and their property’. Charles Rousseau, Droit International Public (Paris, 1970), at 46 
(Cited by OECD Working Papers on International Investment ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
International Investment Law’, No. 2004/3, September 2004, at 8). 
35 See, for example, Ahmad Ghouri, Interaction and Conflict of Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law International, 
2015), Chapter 2 – The Evolution of Investment Treaties.  
36 The OECD Working Papers on International Investment, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law’, supra note 34, at 8.  
37 Including bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs).  
38 Ibid. See also, Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
39  See, for example, The OECD Working Papers on International Investment, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard in International Investment Law’, supra note 34. 
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BITs and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). 40  Whereas investment 
facilitation is not founded on international minimum standards, the Action Menu segregates 
investment facilitation from investment protection and takes the focus of international 
investment policy making away from the contentious standards of protection, effectively 
diverting the international investment policy agenda to an uncontroversial and constructive 
direction and creating new policy space in the name of investment facilitation. 
However, as underlined above, States are free to operationalise the investment 
facilitation framework through their international agreements such as BITs and FTAs. These 
agreements can be tailored to specific preferences of States parties. Inclusion of investment 
facilitation provisions in IIAs will not only bind the States contractually but also promote the 
sense of investment facilitation as a policy goal independent of, or at least parallel to, 
investment protection. In fact, some States, with Brazil leading from the front,41 have already 
begun to reshape their BITs to incorporate the investment facilitation goals. This new 
generation of BITs titled as Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs) 
further confirms the increasing recognition of difference between investment facilitation and 
protection policies. These CIFAs distance their substantive foundation from international 
minimum standards by reaffirming the legislative autonomy and public policy space of States 
parties.42    
Similar discussion on conceptualisation of investment facilitation as an independent 
policy area is gaining momentum in recent years. Hees and Cavalcante, for example, have 
suggested that the most appropriate way to tackling the investment facilitation concept is by 
means of a negative list approach, i.e., by clarifying what is outside the scope of facilitation.43 
The distinction can, according to Hees and Cavalcante, be simplified by deducing that 
facilitation does not include market access, investment protection and ISDS.44 This could 
actually be a useful way to clarify the transformation between distinct yet closely related 
concepts of facilitation, protection and promotion. While the concept of investment facilitation 
will evolve and gain broader recognition over time, such negative list approach can helpfully 
isolate the investment facilitation framework from the disputed areas of international 
investment law, i.e., ISDS, international minimum standards and market access. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Karl P. Sauvant, The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward, E15 Task Force 
on Investment Policy – Policy Options Paper. E15Initiative (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 1 January 2016), at 14-18.  
41 Brazil is reported to have concluded first series of its Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs) 
with Mozambique, Angola and Mexico in 2015 and negotiating further CIFAs with Algeria, Chile, Colombia, 
Morocco, Peru, South Africa and Tunisia. See, Fabio Morosini and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, ‘The Brazilian 
Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment 
Agreements?’, Investment Treaty Network, 4 August 2015.   
42 See the Preamble to the Brazil – Mozambique and Brazil – Angola IFCAs (signed in 2015). An unofficial 
translation of the texts of the Brazil – Mozambique and Brazil –Angola Cooperation and Investment Facilitation 
Agreement (IFCA) by Martin Dietrich Brauch is available at the official website of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD): http://www.iisd.org/ (accessed 19 March 2018). 
43 Felipe Hees and Pedro Mendonça Cavalcante, ‘Focusing on Investment Facilitation – Is It That Difficult?’, 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 202, 19 June 2017. 
44 Ibid.  
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3. SIMILAR INITIATIVES BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS  
 
The UNCTAD’s Action Menu is not the first initiative to rationalise and harmonise investment 
facilitation policies. Two other international organisations have previously endeavoured to 
develop investment facilitation framework, and it is useful to compare those efforts with the 
Action Menu. In 2008, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) published an 
Investment Facilitation Action Plan (APEC’s IFAP or IFAP).45 The APEC’s IFAP states that 
“facilitating investment requires work: a concerted national and international effort to create 
and sustain the most conducive climate for investment on investment facilitation.”46 The IFAP 
describes the scope of investment facilitation as ‘actions taken by governments designed to 
attract foreign investment and maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of its administration 
through all stages of the investment cycle’, and ‘effective investment facilitation can make a 
significant contribution to the sort of broader investment climate reform efforts widely 
practiced by APEC member economies’.47 
There are significant differences between the approaches of UNCTAD’s Action Menu 
and the APEC’s IFAP. First, the references to ‘all stages of investment cycle’ and ‘broader 
investment reform efforts’ indicate that the APEC’s IFAP does not maintain a firm distinction 
between investment facilitation and promotion. This is a significant difference because the 
IFAP is likely to be viewed as an extension to the existing investment promotion and protection 
policy framework operating within the troubled waters of currently crisis ridden international 
investment law. Although the APEC’s IFAP has broadly similar principles set out for 
investment facilitation as compared with the UNCTAD’s Action Menu, the former specifically 
aims to complement the existing international efforts to streamline investment facilitation 
policies.48 On the other hand, as discussed in Part 2 above, the UNCTAD’s Action Menu has 
effectively distanced itself from the existing controversial aspects of international investment 
law, such as the ISDS and international minimum standards. 
Moreover, APEC’s IFAP is a regional initiative aimed at investment facilitation in the 
APEC Member States in accordance with the APEC’s own mandate. The IFAP’s ambitions to 
implement its policy principles go far beyond the aims of Action Menu. For example, the IFAP 
requires provision of assistance for capacity building and technical cooperation to lesser 
developed APEC Member States for implementation of its policy principles, which is further 
supported by measurement and reporting mechanisms. The UNCTAD’s Action Menu, on the 
other hand, does not provide a structured programme for capacity building and implementation 
monitoring system and limits itself to encouraging cooperation between developed and 
developing countries to create such linkages and programmes.49 The Action Menu’s package 
                                                 
45 APEC Investment Facilitation Action Plan (IFAP), 2008/MRT/R/004 (31 May 2008) 1. (hereinafter the ‘APEC’s 
IFAP’).  
46 APEC’s IFAP, ibid., Introduction.  
47 APEC’s IFAP, ibid., What is investment facilitation? 
48 APEC’s IFAP, ibid., Multilateral Investment Facilitation. 
49 The Action Menu, supra note 13, Action Lines 7 to 10.   
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includes actions that countries can choose to implement unilaterally, and options that could 
guide international collaboration or that can be incorporated in IIAs.50    
In 2015, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
published the Policy Framework for Investment (OECD’s PFI or PFI).51 Unlike the APEC’s 
IFAP, the OECD’s PFI has maintained a firm distinction between investment promotion and 
facilitation:52 
Promoting and facilitating investment are two very different types of activities. One is 
about promoting a country or a region as an investment destination, while the other is 
about making it easy for investors to establish or expand their existing investments. 
Effective investment promotion leverages the strong points of a country’s investment 
environment, highlights profitable investment opportunities and helps to identify local 
partners. In terms of facilitation, effective one-stop-shops with single-point authority 
can be a critical factor in investment decisions, especially if they cut down the 
investor’s transaction costs: complex administrative burdens represent significant 
barriers to investment. Effective investment facilitation can also reduce corruption 
risks by decreasing the number of steps involved in the decision-making process. A 
core mandate of investment facilitation includes filling an information gap created by 
incoherent or inaccurate policies. Investment facilitation can thus provide investors 
with much needed clarity vis-à-vis public administration and policies. 
The OECD’s PFI provides a much clearer distinction between investment promotion and 
facilitation. The PFI’s approach, contents, and coverage also provide an opportunity to analyse, 
in comparison with the Action Menu, as to what should be the subject matter of a country’s 
investment facilitation policy. The PFI proposes guidance in twelve policy fields that are 
critically important for improving the quality of a country’s enabling environment for 
investment. 53  In addition to components of domestic investment policy and investment 
promotion and facilitation, the PFI’s policy fields include trade, competition, tax, corporate 
governance, responsible business conduct, human resource development, investment finance, 
public governance, and sustainable investment. The coverage of PFI is, therefore, much broader 
than the Action Menu, which is strictly limited to investment facilitation. However, instead of 
the PFI’s approach to provide broader general guidelines, the Action Menu provides pinpoint 
Action Lines for investment facilitation policy. In doing so, the Action Menu also touches on 
some of the other areas addressed by PFI, however, remaining only within the purview of 
investment facilitation. By bringing every aspect of domestic policy relevant to investment 
facilitation within the pinpoint principles or Action Lines, the Action Menu has not only created 
investment facilitation policy as a separate field of inquiry but has also clarified its subject 
matter, scope and coverage taking the investment facilitation agenda further than the OECD’s 
PFI.      
                                                 
50 UNCTAD’s Action Menu, supra note 13, at 4.  
51 Policy Framework for Investment (2015 ed., OECD Publishing, 2015).    
52 Ibid., at 39.    
53 Ibid., at 3.  
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Recently some groups of States initiated discussion on a possible investment facilitation 
agreement at the WTO.54 Another group of States, led primarily by India, have objected to 
discuss these proposals at the WTO maintaining that investment facilitation rules go beyond 
the WTO’s current mandate. 55  An Indian official has maintained that since investment 
facilitation is completely a bilateral issue linked to domestic policies, its inclusion in the WTO 
agenda would restrict the space for formulation of domestic norms.56 It is quite understandable 
that States have reservations on an internationally mandated multilateral investment facilitation 
framework at this time because it is fairly a new concept and fine distinctions between 
investment facilitation, promotion and protection are not widely understood. More recently in 
Buenos Aires in December 2017, the WTO conducted an open-ended informal dialogue where 
ministers adopted a ‘Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development’.57 
On 31 January 2018, Brazil submitted a draft investment facilitation agreement, which provides 
rubrics of what a multilateral investment facilitation framework at the WTO could look like.58  
These developments at the WTO, although too recent to be fully evaluated in this article, 
illustrate the significance attained by the investment facilitation as an international investment 
policy framework that is independent of existing investment promotion and protection regime. 
The efforts such as APEC’s IFAP, OECD’s PFI and UNCTAD’s Action Menu have provided 
some clarity to the emerging principles of investment facilitation policy, gradually pushing 
towards some sort of global consensus on those principles and opening their way to multilateral 
negotiations at a global platform such as the WTO. It remains to be seen if the WTO would be 
able provide a viable platform for a multilateral agreement on investment facilitation.  
 
4. INFLUENCE ON EXISTING INVESTMENT FACILITATION POLICIES 
 
The Action Menu adopts two broader system level approaches to influence the domestic 
investment facilitation policy, namely, the triangular approach and the whole-of-government 
approach. 
First, it is a common practice to exclude the possible role of home States in the 
governance of investments in host States. For example, most of the existing IIAs do not assign 
any active role to an investor’s home State at either pre- or post-entry stages of investment. In 
the existing international investment regime, home States are not responsible to hold their 
investors accountable if they cause any harm to local populations or violate any established 
international norms. Fittingly realising that there is a policy gap to be filled, the Action Menu 
takes up a triangular approach where the respective roles are assigned to all three foreign 
investment market actors, i.e. investors and both their home and host States, which also includes 
                                                 
54 These five proposals have been submitted by Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development (consisting of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan); MIKTA 
(consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia); China; Russia; and Argentina and Brazil. 
55 South Africa, Uganda and Bolivia are reported to have joined India.   
56 The Economic Times, 15 May 2017. 
57 The statement is available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E& 
CatalogueIdList=240870,240871,240899,240900,240833,240 (accessed 19 March 2018). 
58  The Communication from Brazil is available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=241891&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullT (accessed 19 March 2018).  
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certain actions by home States. Whereas the Action Menu’s triangular approach is undoubtedly 
laudable, it is unclear as to why it curtails itself only to regular consultations between foreign 
investors’ home and host States. It should have gone further by requiring home States to create 
clear domestic procedures and substantive rules to enforce liability against their investors 
abroad for any wrongs committed by them in host States. Such rules on foreign direct liability 
will open avenues for accountability of multinational investors in their home States in cases 
when host States are either unable or unwilling to prevent serious public interest and 
international law violations by foreign investors.59           
Secondly, while States typically aim to ensure some form of overall internal economic 
policy coordination mechanisms among various levels of government across different sectors, 
most developing countries struggle to implement procedures on consultation and coordination 
among various policy making institutions and regulatory bodies responsible for developing and 
implementing detailed investment policies. 60  Lack of coordination among layers of 
government organs has been a major cause of concern for successful formulation and 
implementation of domestic investment policies,61 which undermines the rule of law giving 
rise to investor-State disputes.  
To address the issue of lack of coordination at different levels of government policy 
making and implementation, the Action Menu suggests a whole-of-government (WG) approach 
to promoting and facilitating foreign investment. The WG approach ensures public services 
agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
government response to particular issues.62 The WG approach works better than the traditional 
departmentalism and tunnel vision approach to public governance and aspires to achieve 
horizontal and vertical coordination among public authorities by eliminating situations where 
different policies may undermine each other. Overall, the WG approach creates synergies by 
bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area, offering seamless rather than 
fragmented access to public services, and ensuring better use of scarce resources.63  
The Action Menu suggests the WG approach at all three stages of development, 64 
implementation, 65  and review, 66  of investment facilitation policy. It proposes the WG 
approach at both central and decentral levels of governance. At the central level, the Action 
Menu proposes the implementation of WG approach through investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs), single window or special enquiry point for foreign investors, and online one-stop 
                                                 
59 For some detailed discussion on the need for foreign direct liability rules, see, for example, Marisa McVey, ‘A 
powerful Retort: Foreign Direct Liability as an Essential Mechanism of Redress for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations by Multinational Extractive Corporations’, Postgraduate HRC 2015 Working Paper No. 1, Human Rights 
Centre, Queens University Belfast.   
60 See, for example, Yann Duval, ‘Trade and Investment Linkages and Policy Coordination: Lessons from Case 
Studies in Asian Developing Countries’, Session 1.2: Trade Policy, OECD Global Forum on International 
Investment, Global Forum VII (27-28 March 2008), at 4.  
61  See, for example, OECD, ‘Policy Framework for Investment: A Review of Good Practices’, 2006, Public 
Governance, Chapter 10, at 238.    
62 Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, ‘The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform’, Public 
Administration Review, Nov. – Dec. 2007, 67(6): 1059-66.  
63 Ibid.  
64 See, for example, the UNCTAD Action Menu, supra note 13, Action Line 4. 
65 Ibid., Action Line 7. 
66 Ibid., Action Lines 3 and 5.  
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approval authorities.67 At the decentral level, the Action Menu’s WG approach is supposed to 
be implemented through development of clear rules for institutional cooperation and 
coordination, and by assigning clear roles and accountability procedures between national and 
local government or where more than one agency screens or authorizes investment proposals.68    
To employ the broader system level triangular and whole of government approaches, the 
Action Menu outlines the following seven key areas of national policy that compliment a 
successful investment facilitation framework:69 
(i) Improvements in transparency and information available to investors; 
(ii) Efficiency in administrative procedures for investors;  
(iii) Predictability of the policy environment for investors through consultation 
procedures;  
(iv) Accountability and effectiveness of government officials;  
(v) Mitigation of investment disputes;  
(vi) Cross-border coordination and collaboration initiatives such as links between 
outward and inward investment promotion agencies; and  
(vii) Technical cooperation and other support mechanisms for investment. 
These key areas undoubtedly constitute the most important pillars of any successful FDI 
facilitation framework. 
As far as the existing practice goes, some States have already taken steps consistent with 
the Action Menu’s first two key areas of reform, namely, transparency and information 
available to investors, and efficiency in administrative procedures. Myanmar, for example, 
passed a new investment law embracing the specific aim to pave the way for speedier 
investment approvals.70 Some States have also developed their business licensing procedures 
incorporating investment facilitation framework consistent with the Action Menu’s proposals. 
Angola, for example, passed a new regulation to diminish the bureaucracy surrounding the 
procedures for the admission of investments.71 Likewise, Indonesia has launched a three-hour 
licensing process for investments over 100 billion Indonesian Rupiah and/or that employ at 
least 1,000 workers.72 Ukraine has also made strides to ease licensing procedures in certain 
investment activities by adopting a law on licensing of commercial activities. 73  In 2016, 
Kazakhstan introduced a one-stop shop, enabling investors to apply for more than 360 types of 
permits and licenses without having to visit various ministries or government agencies,74 and 
Turkey announced the launch of a website enabled ‘one-stop shop’ for foreign investors.75  
                                                 
67 See, for example, the UNCTAD Action Menu, supra note 13, Action Lines 1, 5 and 8 to 10.  
68 Ibid., Action Line 3.  
69 Policy Framework for Investment (2015 ed., OECD Publishing, 2015), at 3.  
70 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016 - Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges (UNCTAD/WIR/2016), at 
106.  
71 Ibid. 
72 See for the details: http://www3.bkpm.go.id/ (accessed 18 March 2018). 
73 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016, supra note 70. 
74 See for the details: http://invest.gov.kz/pages/one-stop-shop-for-investors# (accessed 18 March 2018). 
75 See for the details: www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/Pages/Home.aspx (accessed 18 March 2018). 
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These examples of changes in national investment facilitation policies obviously do not 
cover the wide-ranging policy directions and options given by the Action Menu. However, 
States are likely to face increasing demand for implementation of other key areas of investment 
facilitation policy. For example, the Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
(OICCI) in Pakistan has recently asked the Pakistani government to create a structured forum 
to discuss foreign investors’ issues with central and provincial governments.76 The OICCI has 
also demanded for proactive resolution of growing number of interprovincial coordination 
issues, and the formulation and implementation of consistent, transparent and predictable policy 
for foreign investment.77  
For cross-border coordination and collaboration, the UNCTAD has facilitated the 
creation of World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) to provide the 
opportunity for IPAs to network and exchange best practices.78  
On the IIAs level, Brazil has developed a policy putting investment facilitation at the 
core of it new generation of BITs.79 
 
5. DISPUTE FREE FDI FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
 
The Action Menu proposes 10 Action Lines with a series of options for investment 
policymakers and government agencies for national and international policy measures.80 The 
package in each Action Line includes actions that countries can choose to implement 
unilaterally, and options that can guide international collaboration and possibly be incorporated 
in future investment treaties. 81  The 10 specific Action Lines to create or improve the 
investment facilitation climate are as follows: 
(i) Promoting accessibility and transparency in the formulation of investment 
policies and regulations and procedures relevant to investors. 
(ii) Enhancing predictability and consistency in the application of investment 
policies. 
(iii) Improving the efficiency of investment administrative procedures. 
(iv) Building constructive stakeholders relationships in investment policy practice. 
(v) Designating a lead agency, focal point or investment facilitator. 
(vi) Establishing monitoring and review mechanisms for investment facilitation. 
(vii) Enhancing international cooperation on investment facilitation. 
(viii) Strengthening investment facilitation efforts in developing-country partners 
through support and technical assistance. 
                                                 
76 See https://oicci.org/index.php/news/interactive-session-of-the-oicci-managing-committee-with-the-prime-minis 
ter-of-pakistan-mr-shahid-khaqan-abbasi/ (accessed 18 March 2018). See also, supra notes 20, 41 and 42.  
77 Ibid.  
78 See www.waipa.org/ (accessed 18 March 2018).  
79 See supra note 41.  
80 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 4.  
81 Ibid. 
MJIEL Vol. 15 Iss. 2 2018                                        Ahmad Ghouri 
206 
(ix) Enhancing investment policy and proactive investment attraction in developing-
country partners. 
(x) Complementing investment facilitation by enhancing international cooperation 
for investment promotion for development, including through provisions in IIAs. 
These Action Lines clearly provide a wide spectrum of important policy goals to 
facilitate investments in an effective way. The overall objectives of the 10 Action Lines are 
primarily to improve transparency and availability of information to investors through efficient 
administrative procedures to ensure predictability of the policy environment. Lack of 
transparency in host government actions and inconsistent formation and implementation of 
investment policies shatters investor confidence and produces investor-State disputes. The 
Action Line 1 prevents the possibility of disputes due to lack of information by requiring host 
States to ensure consistent flow of information on investment regime through IPAs and timely 
intimation of changes in procedures, applicable standards, technical regulations and 
conformance requirements.  
Likewise, inconsistency amongst various government departments and layers of 
government in the interpretation and application of investment regulations often triggers 
investor-State disputes. The Action Line 2 precludes this possibility by requiring consistent 
application of investment regulations across relevant institutions, avoiding discriminatory use 
of bureaucratic discretion in the application of laws and regulations on investment, and 
establishing clear criteria and procedures for administrative decisions with respect to 
investment screening, appraisal and approval mechanisms. The Action Line 2 further suggests 
to creating amicable dispute settlement mechanisms, including mediation, to facilitate 
investment dispute prevention and resolution. Such mechanisms at national level will 
strengthen domestic institutions, enhance capacity of national policy makers and experts to 
handle investor-State disputes, and reduce reliance on costly and controversial international 
arbitration. Similarly, the Action Line 4 emphasises on maintaining mechanisms for regular 
consultation and effective dialogue between investment policy makers and stakeholders to 
identify and address issues encountered by investors. It further requires establishing 
mechanisms providing investors with an opportunity to comment on proposed new laws, 
regulations and policies or changes to existing ones prior to their implementation. Such regular 
consultations with investors and the possibility to raise their concerns before new laws are 
enacted will undoubtedly contribute to prevent disputes.  
Several other proposals in the Action Menu are aimed at early detection, prevention and 
amicable resolution of investor-Sate disputes. Actions such as improving standards of corporate 
governance and responsible business conduct (Action Line 4), establishment of IPAs to address 
investor complaints and timely action to prevent, manage and resolve disputes (Action Line 5), 
home-host State consultation with stakeholders throughout the investment life cycle with a view 
to addressing specific problems raised by investors and preventing the escalation of investment 
disputes (Action Line 8) are all directly aimed at investor-State dispute prevention. Other 
Actions, such as enhancing efficiency of administrative procedures (Action Line 6), enhancing 
international cooperation on anti-corruption practices in the investment process (Action Line 
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7), home-host States cooperation to conduct feasibility studies for potential investment projects 
including environmental and social impact assessments (Action Line 8), will also massively 
contribute to dispute prevention because investor-State disputes mostly arise due to 
administrative inefficiencies, alleged corruption by government officials, and host States’ 
public policy concerns regarding a foreign investment.       
Undoubtedly, these Action Lines are all valuable proposals for investment facilitation 
and investor-State dispute prevention. However, there are several areas that need further 
clarification, tightening and development.   
The Action Line 1 emphasises on accessibility and transparency of investment policy 
requiring, among other things, clear definitions of criteria for assessing investment proposals. 
This appears to be a mission impossible. Although clear rules can be made for some sectors, 
various investment proposals will never be the same in every possible aspect requiring a case-
by-case assessment. Foreign investments will also need to pass through the fluid criteria of 
‘national interest’, which include factors such as ‘national security’ and sometimes also 
‘national economic security’.82 National interest apprehensions are present even in countries 
having the most transparent FDI policies. Australia, for example, describes itself as a highly 
transparent country providing a detailed outline of foreign investment policy.83  However, 
protectionist remnants of national interest continue to shadow Australia’s transparency 
objectives despite having a detailed and apparently transparent foreign investment policy.84             
The first three Action Lines emphasise shortening of screening times to ensure 
procedural and administrative efficiency at various stages of investments. However, shortening 
the screening and processing times may produce unexpected complications during the life of 
investments. Although the Action Line 3 does state speeding up in ‘appropriate situations’,85 it 
neither clarifies what situations might justify delays in approval nor provides guidelines to 
mitigate possible harmful outcomes of fast-tracking. Speeding up processing times will surely 
increase the satisfaction of foreign investors, however, emphasis on investment facilitation 
should not aim to completely eliminate administrative discretion. It will likely be unacceptable 
to most States.  
The Action Line 4 proposes building of constructive stakeholder relationships in 
investment policy making practice by seeking comments on proposed legislation from the 
business community. Although this proposal is appropriate where host States strive to provide 
an investment-friendly atmosphere for investors; developing countries, particularly least 
developed countries, are likely to remain cautious of ruthless lobbying by powerful foreign 
stakeholders fearing that their domestic legislative process might be hijacked. Developing 
countries can easily lose ground to foreign stakeholders who, as some studies have suggested, 
                                                 
82 See, for example, Vivienne Bath, ‘Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security – Foreign 
Direct Investment in Australia and China’, Sydney Law Review, 2012, 34(5): 5-34.  
83  The detailed and regularly updated document on Australia’s foreign investment policy can be found here: 
https://firb.gov.au/resources/policy-documents/ (accessed 18 March 2018).   
84 See, for example, Andrew Lumsden, ‘The “National Interest Test” and Australian Foreign Investment Laws’ 
2016, The Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation – University of New South Wales, Australia.  
85 The Action Menu, supra note 13, Action Line 3, sub-line 1.  
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can spin media, engineer conclusions, sponsor think-tank campaigns, and even buy 
credibility.86      
Likewise, there is an established nexus between strands of FDI and achievement of 
sustainable development goals (SDGs).87 However the Action Menu does not appear to have 
provided an effective stimulus policy package to achieve SDGs through FDI. The preamble of 
the Action Menu states that any facilitation initiative cannot be considered in isolation from the 
broader investment for development agenda:88 
Effective investment facilitation efforts should support the mobilization and 
channelling of investment towards sustainable development, including the build-up of 
productive capacities and critical infrastructure. It should be an integral part of the 
overall investment policy framework, aimed at maximizing the benefits of investment 
and minimizing negative side effects. 
However, despite repeatedly emphasising sustainable development in its preamble, the 
Action Menu contains only one sub-line Action Line 9 that suggests policy direction for 
sustainable development. The sub-line reads as follows: 
Build expertise in IPAs (or relevant agencies) for the promotion of sustainable-
development-focused investments such as green investments and social impact 
investments. 
This is by no means a comprehensive treatment of sustainable development goals in the 
Action Menu. The Action Menu should provide that every investment proposal should contain 
a detailed statement explaining as to how it will contribute to sustainable development. The 
Action Menu should make proposals to ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to 
evaluate the possible positive and negative effects on sustainable development of proposed 
investments. Additionally, the Action Menu should recommend that the investors’ home States 
have given their expert input in the evaluation process of the sustainable development aspects 
of proposed investments. Depending on the nature of a proposed project being long, medium 
or short term, the sustainable development aspects should be regularly monitored, and any 
negative aspects are gradually phased out if it is impossible to initiate investment without 
negative effects on sustainable development. The Action Menu should also promote the idea of 
enforcement of liability in investors’ home States for any harm caused by the investors to 
sustainable development in host States. This is particularly useful for developing and least 
developed host States with poor regulatory and enforcement capacities. 
                                                 
86 See, for example, Tamasin Cave and Andy Rowell, ‘The Truth about Lobbying: 10 Ways Big Business Controls 
Government’, The Guardian, 12 March 2014.   
87 The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has repeatedly emphasised on the need for more FDI to 
achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs). The UN 2030 Agenda is available at: https://sustainabledevelopment 
.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (accessed 15 May 2018). See also the presentation on Investment 
Facilitation by James Zhan as UNCTAD’s Perspective, available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload 
/Documents/JamesZhan_PresentationOnInvestmentFacilitation.30-9-2016.pdf (accessed 18 March 2018). 
88 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 4.  
UNCTAD Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation 
209 
FDI being an engine for long term economic growth, there is widespread consensus that 
the regulation of FDI is a catalyser for sustainable development.89 Given the widely recognised 
benefits of FDI, States have found themselves in a competition to attract FDI. However, these 
measures have also resulted in compromises. For some States, investment promotion meant 
lowering public interest regulatory standards or allowing their poor enforcement, a practice 
which is commonly referred to as a race to the bottom. 90  UNCTAD has previously 
acknowledged that investment promotion and investment facilitation measures could lead 
countries to a race to the bottom where ‘more and more countries seek to boost investment and 
target specific types of investment, the risk of harmful competition for investment increases; 
i.e. a race to the regulatory bottom or a race to the top of incentives’.91  
Developing countries are more likely to engage in race to the bottom strategies as 
developed countries maintain more rigorous standards adding cost to business operations.92 
States may deliberately generate a race to the bottom by lowering certain standards in order to 
attract foreign investment. 93  This tendency could emerge from different measures of 
investment promotion and facilitation. For example, special economic zones, which are viewed 
as one of the most prominent ways of promoting investment by providing a favourable legal 
regime to foreign investors, can induce a race to the bottom.94 The theory of environmental 
regulatory competition suggests that competition for becoming an investment spot leads to a 
race to the bottom of environmental standards.95 Likewise, tax incentives is another factor that 
may triggered regulatory competition leading to a race to the bottom on financial regulation, 
risking international financial instability.96  
This negative investment promotion strategy is also sometimes reciprocated by foreign 
investors who seek to invest in States with undeveloped public interest regulations and 
                                                 
89 As it has been showcased in the UNCED Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
13 June 1992, adopted by the UNCED at Rio de Janeiro. UN Doc A/CONF. 151 /26 (Vol. 1) (1992); I.L.M. 874, 
1992 (Rio). 
90 See, for example, William W. Olney, ‘A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and Foreign Direct 
Investment’, Journal of International Economics, 2013, 91(2): 191-203; Pasquale Pazienza, The Relationship 
Between FDI and the Natural Environment (Springer Briefs in Economics, 2014), at 27-35.   
91 See Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2015) (UNCTADDIAE/PCB/2015/5) National 
Investment Policy Guidelines, Guideline 2.4.17. ‘Environmental, labour and other regulatory standards should not 
be lowered as a means to attract investment, or to compete for investment in a “regulatory race to the bottom”’ and 
Guideline 2.4.19. ‘Investment incentives over and above pre-defined incentives must be shown to make an 
exceptional contribution to development objectives, and additional requirements should be attached, including with 
a view to avoiding a “race to the top of incentives”’. 
92 Rajeev D. Mathur, ‘Investment Facilitation and Regulation in Developing Countries’, Briefing Paper No. 3, 2005, 
3, available at: www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Investment_Facilitation_and_Regulation_in_Developing_Countries.pdf 
(accessed 19 March 2018). 
93 Judith M. Dean, Mary E. Lovely and Hua Wang, ‘Are Foreign Investors Attracted to Weak Environmental 
Regulations? Evaluating the Evidence from China’, Economics Faculty Scholarship, Paper 88, 2005, at 1. 
94 Studies have found the environmental decline in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). For details, see Kevin R. 
Gray, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Impacts – Is the Debate Over?’, Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law, 2002,11(3): 306-13, at 309; Krishna V. Vadlamannati and Haider 
A. Khan, ‘Race to the Top or Race to the Bottom? Competing for Investment Proposals in Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs): Evidence from Indian States 1998 – 2010’, 2011, available at: www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren 
/intwipol/top_bottom.pdf (accessed 18 March 2018). 
95 For details, see Katharina Holzinger and Thomas Sommerer, ‘“Race to the Bottom” or “Race to Brussels”? 
Environmental Competition in Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2011, 49 (2): 315-39, at 317.   
96 See generally Bruno Gurtner and John Christensen, ‘The Race to The Bottom: Incentives for New Investment?’, 
Tax Justice Network, 2008, available at: www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Bruno-John_0810_Tax_Comp.pdf 
(accessed 19 March 2018).  
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environmental standards.97 Resultantly, instead of sustainable growth, host States are damaged 
in the long term either by undermining their public interest or failing to protect citizenry rights.  
Despite its claim to support investment facilitation in low income countries maximizing 
the benefits of investment and minimizing negative side effects,98 the Action Menu does not 
make any policy recommendation to prevent race to the bottom. Although the Action Line 9 
insists on cooperation between developed and developing countries in capacity building, the 
Action Menu should have addressed the issue of race to the bottom directly. For example, a 
sub-line can be added to the Action Line 9 urging developed countries to notify the developing 
country partners of their conceivable race to the bottom policies, and actively work with them 
to reformulate such policies. The Action Line 10 requires the maintenance of high standards of 
corporate governance and responsible business conduct by outward investors. 99  Another 
possibility to address the issue of race to the bottom could be by way of strengthening the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) regime in the investors’ home States, and by providing 
effective remedies for any breaches of CSR by their investors operating in other States. 
 
6. IPAS AS MAJOR PLAYERS IN INVESTMENT FACILITATION 
 
The Action Menu recommends the implementation of investment facilitation policy through 
national investment promotion agencies (IPAs), and requires States to make arrangements that 
their IPAs create effective means to liaise with other national and international organisations. 
Research shows that IPAs provide a cost-effective means of increasing inflows of FDI for 
developing countries, particularly those where information about business conditions is less 
readily available and bureaucratic procedures tend to be more burdensome.100 Other research 
shows that regular consultations and cooperation between IPAs and other governmental bodies 
and relevant authorities is likely to increase efficiency and reduce procedural and administrative 
uncertainty.101  
IPAs are in fact an important tool for investment facilitation. In terms of their structure, 
IPAs are governmental bodies that aim to organise investment promotion and facilitation 
activities. IPAs typically work either as part of a ministry or as an independent agency, and 
usually have four types of responsibilities:102 
1. Advocacy within government to seek necessary approvals or urge the removal of 
obstacles to investment;  
2. Image building to promote the country as an investment destination;  
                                                 
97 Jing-Lin Duanmu, ‘A race to lower standards? Labor standards and location choice of outward FDI from the 
BRIC countries’, International Business Review, 2014, 23(3): 620-34.  
98 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 4.  
99 The Action Menu, supra note 13, Action Line 10. 
100  See Torfinn Harding and Beata S. Javorcik, ‘Roll Out the Red Carpet and They Will Come: Investment 
Promotion and FDI Inflows’, The Economic Journal, December 2011, 121(557): 1445-76.  
101 See Sarah B. Danzman, ‘Leveraging WIAPA to Facilitate Private Sector Linkages’, World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) Research Note Series, April 2017.  
102 OECD Policy Framework for Investment User’s Toolkit, Chapter 2. Investment Promotion and Facilitation, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/investmentpromotionfacilitation/41246119.pdf 
(accessed 19 March 2018), at 6.  
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3. Investor servicing or facilitation to help solve problems faced by existing or 
potential investors; and  
4. Targeting or investment generation by actively seeking out investors based on 
national development plans. 
It is generally recognised that IPAs reduce the cost of investment transactions and attract 
the attention of global investment communities along with improving the image and business 
environment for private sector.103  
Several Action Lines in the Action Menu refer to the possible role and benefits of IPAs 
for investment facilitation. However, the Action Menu does not seem to focus much on the 
image building side of the IPAs role, which is an important feature of investment facilitation 
policy. Studies show that low-income countries may get increased inflows of foreign 
investment from improving the business environment rather than from the investment 
promotion.104 The success of IPAs more earnestly relies on host States’ image and their overall 
business environment. The well-known key determinants for a favourable business 
environment are security, macroeconomic stability based on economic policies, good 
governance and the rule of law, and well-developed financial and physical infrastructures. 
Without policy guidelines on image building and good business environment for host States, 
the Action Menu’s investment facilitation framework is incomplete.  
The long-term success of a developing country IPA will ultimately be determined by its 
strategy to achieve non-economic contributions along with economic development through FDI. 
However, the Action Menu does not emphasise the need for IPAs to synchronise foreign 
investors’ business expectations with the host States’ development objectives. Although the 
Action Menu recognises that facilitating investment is crucial for inclusive growth,105 it does 
not require specific actions to ensure achievement of inclusive growth through FDI. Due to the 
varied range of inclusive growth objectives,106 it is perhaps not possible to provide precise 
actions for every aspect of inclusive growth to be achieved through FDI. However, in order to 
create a better nexus between achievement of inclusive growth through investment facilitation 
policies, the Action Menu should include a specific action that IPAs should assess which 
inclusive growth objectives are to be achieved through an admitted FDI and conduct a 
periodical review and reporting whether those objectives have come through. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The UNCTAD’s Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation is a step in the right direction. 
At the time when international investment regime is fraught with internal antagonism, the 
Action Menu’s investment facilitation framework brings positive vibes to international 
                                                 
103 Dirk W. Te Velde, supra note 17, at 8. 
104 Jaques Morisset and Kelly Andrews-Johnson, ‘The Effectiveness of Promotion Agencies at Attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment’, Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No. 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2001), available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15073/271500PAPER0Ef1f0pro 
motion0agencies.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 19 March 2018), at 12-4. 
105 The Action Menu, supra note 13, at 3.   
106 See, for example, ‘What is “inclusive growth”?’, CAFOD Discussion Paper (Full Version), August 2014. 
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investment law and policy making. The Action Menu provides good policy praxis to redirect 
the development of international investment regime to a less adversarial and a more 
constructive path. It suggests rebuilding of future international investment law and policy with 
a reconciliatory spirit and by promoting investment facilitation for sustainable development.  
The host States can benefit from the Action Menu by implementing its Action Lines that 
ensure transparent and predictable business environment for foreign investors and their 
investments. The objectives of the Action Menu are clear: it deals with investment facilitation 
and not promotion although both yield the same results of an open and easy flow of FDI. 
However, UNCTAD must ensure that the Action Menu’s distinction between investment 
promotion and facilitation is not misconstrued as a covert attempt to achieve the objectives of 
pre-entry investment treaty model through domestic regulation of FDI. For this purpose, the 
UNCTAD should include a statement in the Action Menu clarifying that its focus is on the post-
entry facilitation only and not to influence domestic rules and policies on admission of FDI.  
The UNCTAD’s Action Menu contains comparable policy recommendations that are 
included in similar initiatives by the APEC’s IFAP and the OECD’s PFI. However, although 
the APEC’s IFAP aims to deal with investment facilitation as a separate policy subject, it 
conflates promotion with facilitation by suggesting recommendations for all stages of the 
investment cycle. The OECD’s PFI, on the other hand, provides a clear distinction between 
investment facilitation and investment promotion. However, the OECD’s PFI provides broad 
general guidelines instead of the specific policy actions for investment facilitation. The 
UNCTAD’s Action Menu fills this gap. The Action Menu is, therefore, an important and timely 
effort because it adds new discourses to foreign investment facilitation policy making.  
Some of the Action Lines clearly reflect existing policies implemented by States. 
However, the Action Menu’s objective to detach the agenda of investment facilitation policy in 
a precise manner from the contested areas of international investment law, such as investor-
State arbitration and international minimum standards, will benefit all States including those 
that have already taken steps in the right direction as well as those that are lagging far behind. 
The Action Menu’s triangular approach, i.e. bringing the foreign investors as well as their home 
and host States together under one umbrella policy, is also laudable as the Action Menu 
effectively provides a one stop policy guide for all the relevant stakeholders. Likewise, the 
Menu’s ‘whole-of-government’ approach usefully promotes the sense of concerted 
administrative activism and much needed collective responsibility on part of a host States’ 
government agencies and authorities. These triangular and whole-of-government approaches 
will likely play a significant role to prevent investor-State disputes.   
Whereas the Menu’s Action Lines undoubtedly provide useful proposals for investment 
facilitation and make important advances towards the construction of policy framework for 
investment facilitation, following are the primary areas that require improvement, clarification 
and strengthening: 
1. It is unrealistic to assume that States would sacrifice national interest for the sake of 
transparency and predictability. The Action Menu’s policy recommendations should 
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reflect this necessary compromise to give a balanced and more realistic view on 
expectations of transparency and predictability.  
2. The Action Menu should recognise that not all administrative discretion is bad for 
investment facilitation agenda for sustainable development. It may not be sensible to 
shorten the screening of all types of investment proposals and such an expectation 
sounds unreasonable.  
3. The Action Menu should be mindful of the fact that most developing and least 
developed countries are susceptible to policy hijacking by the all-powerful 
multinational corporations and may not accept the idea of too much involvement in the 
domestic law-making processes. Although consultation in this regard is a good practice, 
it should not be translated into a free licence for a ruthless campaign to implement 
corporate agenda.  
4. The Action Menu should include specific policy direction as to how concerted 
sustainable development agenda can be incorporated within the investment facilitation 
policy framework. The Action Menu should promote the idea of enforcement of 
liability in investors’ home States for any harm caused by the investors to sustainable 
development in host States. 
5. The Action Menu should directly address the issue of race to the bottom. The Menu 
should include policy directions on the protection of public interests that might be 
challenged by the investment facilitation policies. A sub-line can be added to the Action 
Line 9 urging developed countries to notify the developing country partners of their 
conceivable race to the bottom policies, and actively work with them to reformulate 
such policies. Another possibility to address the issue of race to the bottom could be by 
way of strengthening the CSR regime in the investors’ home States and by providing 
effective remedies for any breaches of CSR by their investors operating in other States. 
6. The Action Menu’s suggestion for the creation of IPAs is good, however, the Menu 
should make further recommendations for image building and the creation of a 
favourable business environment in host States. There should be directions on 
maintenance of security, macroeconomic stability based on economic policies, good 
governance and the rule of law in the Action Menu.  
7. Finally, the Action Menu’s proposals should also include assessment by IPAs of both 
economic and non-economic development objectives of host States as part of 
investment facilitation policy and to establish a reporting mechanism on inclusive 
growth. 
